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Abstract
Many U.S. agricultural commodity industries are currently considering if and how they might
implement a mandatory national generic promotion program. As U.S. industries consider how to
ﬁnance these programs, one of the key decisions they face is the choice to include or exempt imported
products from promotional assessment fees. Free-riders, unwilling riders, exclusion costs, economies
of scale, market share, seasonality of production, storage constraints, and the role of government are
reviewed within the context of this choice. The paper concludes that perceptions of fairness and
ownership of decision processes, commonly held objectives, and effective communication links are
key factors affecting decisions about the structures of generic commodity promotion programs.
© 2001 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
As recently noted in the trade press, a number of U.S. agricultural commodity industries
are considering if and how they might implement a mandatory national generic promotion
program.
2 These programs would ﬁnance generic (i.e., not brand-speciﬁc) advertising and
promotional activities designed to increase demand for an agricultural industry’s products.
Although considerable research has examined whether or not these programs have positive
ﬁnancial and economic returns, little work has examined the a priori decisions an industry
faces when its members are considering whether or not to implement a generic promotional
program. A particularly illustrative example of these types of decisions is the choice between
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Thirteen promotional programs already exist. Seven of these 13 collect promotional
assessment fees on imports. As other U.S. agricultural commodity industries consider how
they can best organize and ﬁnance the promotion of their products, these industries will need
to analyze the potential advantages and disadvantages of assessing imports as a component
of a national generic demand expansion program.
This article (1) outlines several economic issues related to implementing a national
mandatory generic promotion program (e.g., high exclusion cost goods, free riding, econo-
mies of scale), (2) analyzes key considerations and market conditions that would, in part,
help determine if assessments on imports could be a viable part of such a program, and (3)
explores the potentials of import assessments as possible elements of regional industry-wide
strategic efforts to expand demand in light of a more global marketing context.
This paper takes as given the proposition that generic commodity promotions can provide
positive returns to an agricultural industry. As Ward notes, “Commodity advertising and
promotion programs have had a positive impact on demand for many commodities. These
increases have been large enough to beneﬁt producers in many of the case studies [in which
researchers analyzed the ﬁnancial and economic returns to particular promotional programs].
There are considerable differences in the rates of return as would be expected given the
substantial differences among the commodity programs (Ward, 1993, p. 42).” Alston et al.
suggest that with agricultural commodity promotion “the total payoff to advertising and its
distribution, and the optimum advertising effort from the viewpoint of both producers and
society, depend on how the advertising is ﬁnanced. They also depend on the structure of the
market for the commodity, and on the nature of any government interventions, such as trade
barriers and farm programs (Alston et al., 1994, p. 162).”
These comments reﬂect what appears to be a general consensus within the literature about
the returns to promotion programs: generic promotional programs typically have positive
rates of return, but that the potential returns of any single program are dependent on a broad
set of market and policy factors.
2. Alternative institutional arrangements for generic promotion
Agricultural commodity industries have several alternatives for organizing and ﬁnancing
industry generic advertising and promotion of their commodities. These include national
promotion programs (established either by the Secretary of Agriculture as authorized in the
1996 farm bill or by free-standing legislation), federal marketing orders, federal marketing
agreements, state-level marketing orders, and state-level marketing-promotional commis-
sions. And in some commodity industries, marketing commissions from several states have
voluntarily banded together to form multistate promotional programs. Each of these insti-
tutional arrangements is described in greater detail in the appendix. As is noted there, these
arrangements differ primarily in terms of geographic scope, speciﬁc program mandates, and
degree of required participation (e.g., mandatory or voluntary). Another important distinction
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mandatory the collection of promotional assessment fees on imported agricultural products.
3. Free riders and high exclusion costs
In most market situations, a ﬁrm that produces a “good” (i.e., a product or service, tangible
or intangible) is able to sell that good and reap most, if not all, of the beneﬁts from this sale.
And a ﬁrm would tend to avoid producing goods that, when made available, other ﬁrms could
capture some or all of the beneﬁts of their provision. The exclusion costs are the costs a ﬁrm
has to incur to prevent other ﬁrms from capturing the economic beneﬁts of a ﬁrm’s activities
(Schmid, 1987). When exclusion costs are low, a ﬁrm can readily defend its vested interests,
and protect and keep for itself the “rents” (e.g., revenue, reputation enhancement, increased
market demand) generated by the provision of a good. Patents and their enforcement are an
example of an institutional arrangement to keep exclusion costs low. When exclusion costs
are high, other ﬁrms can readily capture some or all of the rents that result from the provision
of the good without having to compensate the individual ﬁrm that provided the good. Firms
who seek to capture rents without having to pay for the provision of the activities that
generated those rents are often referred to as free riders.
In the speciﬁc case of generic promotion of an agricultural commodity, a marketing board
or promotional board provides advertising and promotion on behalf of the producers and
other industry participants within the geographic scope of the program. In essence, the
producers and other industry participants that fund a generic program are the “owners.” The
program board’s actions, that is, the advertising and promotion activities that it organizes, are
the “production process.” The beneﬁts of the advertising and promotion activities (e.g.,
demand expansion) are the “goods” resulting from this production process.
However, most of the output of this production process (i.e., expanded demand) is a high
exclusion cost good. Firms not participating in the promotion or marketing board are in an
advantageous position. They are able to beneﬁt from the gains in market demand for the
commodity without contributing ﬁnancial support to the program’s activities that generated
those gains. This suggests that the geographic scope and institutional structure of a promo-
tional program can substantially inﬂuence the degree to which some ﬁrms can act as free
riders. Table 1 lists the various institutional arrangements that can be used in the U.S. to
create generic industry promotional programs, as well as the potential for free-riding that is
inherent in each.
As noted in Table 1, national promotion programs have the greatest potential to lessen free
rider problems. These programs are national in scope, and generally are mandatory in the
sense that once these programs are established all producers/growers and/or processors must
pay assessment fees to the program.
3 And when national promotion programs include
assessments on imported products, essentially all U.S. market volume of a commodity (i.e.,
U.S. domestic and foreign grown production exported to the U.S.) is assessed fees to support
the program.
4 As is indicated in the far right column of Table 1, no other organizational
structure can prevent importers from free-riding.
Federal marketing orders may or may not be national in scope, and are not permitted to
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ing order, there is a greater potential for free riding by imports than with a national promotion
program that assesses imports. On the other hand, state-level marketing orders usually have
an even narrower geographic scope than federal marketing orders. Unless total U.S. pro-
duction is highly concentrated in one state, state marketing orders are fairly susceptible to
free-riding by producers/growers and/or processors in other states and other producing
countries that export products to the U.S. State marketing commissions that have voluntary
participation have especially high potentials for free-riding because they are limited in
geographic scope, and participation in the programs within the state is not completely
mandatory. Multistate promotion programs are another means to address free-riding. Be-
cause multistate programs have a broader geographic scope and may standardize the assess-
ment rates within participating states, they can reduce the potential for free-riding in
comparison to individual state programs.
3.1. Minimizing the potential for free riding—further implications
The typical result of high exclusion costs is the undersupply or the nonprovision of the
good. Because it is difﬁcult for a ﬁrm that provides a high exclusion cost good to actually
capture all, or even most, of the beneﬁts of its efforts, it is unlikely that any ﬁrm will provide
the good. In the case of agricultural commodity industries, individual producers/growers,
processors and/or importers are unlikely to independently ﬁnance generic commodity pro-
Table 1
Alternative organizational structures for generic commodity promotion and the potential for free riding
Programs Potential for free riding







low medium to high
Federal Marketing Order low within covered regions,
medium to high out of regions
medium to high
a
Federal Marketing Agreement medium to high high










medium to high in state, high out
of state
high
Multi-state Promotion Program medium to high high
a Although Federal Marketing Orders cannot be used to assess imports, they can be used to set quantity
controls, grades, and size and maturity standards. If a marketing order includes grade or quality standards on both
U.S. production and imports, these controls can limit the total volume of imported products in a commodity
market. In these circumstances, federal marketing orders can indirectly reduce to some degree the amount of
free-riding by importers.
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started unless producers/growers, processors and/or importers are able to organize into some
form of collective action that reduces the possibility of free-riding.
Thus, institutional arrangements like generic promotion programs that lower the potential
of free riding also create an institutional setting that makes the provision of a high exclusion
cost good possible. Not only can generic promotion programs be structured to reduce
free-riding, but more generally, they make possible activities that are intended to enhance
demand for agricultural commodities—an enhanced demand that probably would not be
realized without the generic promotion programs.
Minimizing the potential for free-riding has still other implications. The creation of
organizational structures that reduce the potential for free-riding tend to increase the possi-
bility of creating unwilling riders. Unwilling riders are program participants who would
choose not to participate in a promotional program if their participation was not mandatory.
Unwilling riders are, by deﬁnition, those participants who believe that their costs of partic-
ipation (e.g., assessments) are greater than the beneﬁts that they receive (e.g., increased
demand for their products). For example, importers who are required to pay assessments into
a program that they perceive primarily beneﬁts domestic producers are likely to be unwilling
riders in that program.
National promotional programs are structured to give voice to unwilling riders. A con-
tinuance referendum is required if a minimum of 10% of a national promotion program’s
participants sign a petition requesting such a referendum. A program will become inactive if
a majority of those under the program vote to suspend or discontinue it in a continuance
referendum. The implication of a vote to discontinue or suspend a program is that the
majority of participants at the time of the vote had been unwilling riders.
4. Market structure and generic promotion
Addressing the problem of free riders is not the sole criterion for choosing a particular
institutional arrangement for generic promotion of an agricultural commodity. Past experi-
ences indicate that other issues must be considered as industries try to resolve whether or not
to assess imports. The viability of a generic promotion program (as partially reﬂected in its
continued support through industry-wide referenda on program continuance) also is inﬂu-
enced by several market characteristics. These include the share of the U.S. market that is
supplied by imported product, the seasonality of fresh production, and the degree to which
the industry’s products are stored and/or processed.
4.1. Market share
If the portion of U.S. sales volume that comes from imports increases, several factors must
be considered. If generic promotion is not funded in part by assessments on imported
products, then the increasing imported portion of total U.S. market volume is free riding. To
counter this an industry can, through a national promotion program, assess imported prod-
ucts. However, current USDA regulations require that if importers contribute to a promo-
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their contribution.
5 U.S. producers and industry participants may object to “their” promotion
boards being “co-opted” with an increasing presence of importers on the board. This is
particularly true if U.S. industry participants believe that importers’ vested interests are
counter to their own, favoring the interest of producers/growers in other countries who are
exporting their products to the U.S.
The issue underlying these concerns is that collective provision of a high exclusion cost
good raises the problem of who gets to determine the speciﬁc characteristics of how that
good is provided (e.g., the emphasis of an advertising campaign or promotion). Importers on
a board will be able to exercise some inﬂuence over the speciﬁc content of the board’s
advertising and promotional activities. Domestic producers/growers and/or processors may
not want to cede to importers a portion of their control over this process. They may believe
that importers will change the characteristics of a promotional program in ways that will be
detrimental to U.S. domestic interests. Thus, decisions about the institutional structure of a
promotional program (e.g., whether to include or exclude importers), will inﬂuence to some
degree whose interests are most reﬂected in the promotional board’s activities.
4.2. Seasonality
Seasonality of production potentially can reinforce an industry’s decision to include
assessment fees on imported product. A commodity industry selling fresh produce can
beneﬁt from having year-round supply in retail grocery stores. Imported fresh products from
countries near the equator or the southern hemisphere can help maintain shelf space in U.S.
retail stores when U.S. production is out-of-season. This continuous availability can help
increase consumer awareness and subsequently, consumer demand for the commodity. In
cases like these, importers and the U.S. industry are not competing directly with each other
and share the common goal of “growing the market.”
Alternatively, imported product can directly compete with U.S. grown produce because of
overlapping harvest and marketing periods between regions. The degree to which harvests
overlap will have some inﬂuence on how strongly different regions are competing. For
example, in some cases production zones straddle an international border (e.g., the U.S. and
Canadian, or U.S. and Mexican borders). Harvest seasons may be very close to each other
and hence the competition will be quite strong. In other situations, competition may be less
severe if the harvest seasons only partially overlap, with foreign grown produce coming into
season and entering the U.S. market when inventories of U.S. grown products have reached
a low point at the end of the U.S. marketing cycle, but before a new U.S. crop is ready for
harvest.
When imports compete with U.S. domestic production, a U.S. domestic agricultural
commodity industry will have to balance and resolve conﬂicting objectives. “Growing the
overall market” is still a commonly held objective of both U.S. industry participants and
foreign growers exporting to the U.S. However, the distributional share of the market is a
potentially contentious point between importers and a U.S. industry. Perceived threats and
trade-offs between the beneﬁts and costs associated with these conﬂicting objectives will
inﬂuence an industry’s decisions about including assessments on imported products.
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Storage technology can inﬂuence the degree to which U.S. and imported produce compete.
Fresh commodities that are easily stored for year-round sales are much more likely to
compete with imported produce than those with shorter, annual marketing periods. If a U.S.
industry has year-round supplies, U.S. producers/growers may be hesitant to collaborate with
importers in a national promotion program because they see importers as their direct
competitors.
Imported product can also compete against U.S. production if part or all of a commodity
industry’s production is processed before being sold (i.e., conditions where seasonality or
storage constraints because of spoilage are minimal). In the event that consumers do not or
cannot distinguish between U.S. and foreign grown products used to make the processed
good, a joint import-U.S. industry promotion program is likely to beneﬁt both. However, the
relative proportion of gain each will capture depends on other issues like market shares and
consumer preferences. In these circumstances, industry perceptions about who gains what
can inﬂuence decisions about whether or not to include import assessments in a promotion
program.
Competition from imports can also arise if imported fresh produce is taking away market
share from U.S. grown produce that has been processed (e.g., canned or frozen). This also
creates conﬂicting objectives between imports and the U.S. industry, and complicates the
decision to include assessments on imports in a national generic promotion program.
To analyze the relative inﬂuence these selected market characteristics have on the decision
to assess imports, the seven commodities that have national promotion programs that
mandate the collection of assessment fees on imported products are summarized in Table 2.
Selected market characteristics for the six national promotion programs that do not assess
imports are summarized in Table 3.
Overall, the information in these tables suggests that none of the selected market char-
Table 2
Selected market characteristics for commodities with national promotion programs that collect assessment
fees on imported products








Beef 9 high high
Upland Cotton 1
a high high
Honey 45 high high
Fresh Mushrooms 2 low low
Pork 4 high high
Potatoes 5 medium medium
Watermelons 10 low low
a Most foreign grown cotton is imported into the U.S. as retail cotton based products, not as baled, unprocessed
cotton.
Source: USDA-AMS, various documents; USDA-WASDE and USDA-NASS, various tables. Estimates
based on market data reported during the mid-1990s.
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have chosen to include import assessments as part of their national promotion programs. For
example, if the percentage of total U.S. sales from imports is high, there appears to be an
increased likelihood that imported products will be assessed. But cotton and fresh mush-
rooms seem to be exceptions to this because these two commodities have very low levels of
imported raw commodities, yet imports are assessed. With cotton, this is readily understood
because the Cotton Board also assesses the cotton content of all imported textile and apparel
products. The vast majority of foreign grown cotton that comes into the U.S. is in the form
of ﬁnished goods, not raw product, so the 1% of U.S. movement of baled cotton that comes
from imports noted in Table 2 greatly underestimates the de facto amount of cotton imports.
On the other hand, imported fresh mushrooms comprise only a very small percentage of total
market sales in the U.S. This suggests that other factors have inﬂuenced the decision to
include import assessment fees as part of the fresh mushrooms promotion program.
5. Content and type of advertising and promotion
Several issues related to the scope and scale of advertising and promotion activities are
affected by an industry’s decisions about the organizational structure that it uses to imple-
ment its promotion program. Consequently, decisions about the structure of a generic
promotion program inﬂuence the content, type, and mix of activities that can be organized
by the program.
5.1. Content
If an agricultural commodity industry organizes at the national level, then it can promote
its commodity with a national identity (e.g., U.S. peanuts). This national identity can be
marketed in a similar manner as a brand-name product is marketed. However, if assessments
are placed on imported products, USDA regulations prohibit U.S. national identity “brand-
Table 3
Selected market characteristics for commodities with national promotion programs that do not collect
assessment fees on imported products








Dairy 5 low high
Eggs .01 low low
Fluid Milk 5 low high
Peanuts 4 high high
Popcorn 1 high high
Soybeans 0.2 high high
Source: USDA-AMS, various documents; USDA-WASDE and USDA-NASS, various tables. Estimates
based on market data reported during the mid-1990s.
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Other White Meat” but not “U.S. Pork”). Industries must decide if the potential beneﬁts of
national branding exceed or are less than the potential beneﬁts from including imports in an
assessment program.
6
5.2. Type and mix
The size of a national promotion program’s annual budget is one of the most inﬂuential
determinants of the type and mix of advertising and promotional activities that a promotional
board undertakes. Among commodity program managers and other industry participants, a
commonly quoted “rule of thumb” suggests that a minimum of $20 million annually is
needed to run an effective nationwide television campaign. As noted in Table 4, many
national promotional programs do not have budgets that reach this minimum threshold.
Research has shown that promotional boards with annual budgets that are much less than $20
million can effectively promote their commodities, but these programs have organized
promotional activities that do not emphasize television advertising with national coverage.
Often, these alternative activities include regional targeting of television advertising and/or
other promotion activities, using a mix of media including print, radio and billboard, and
coupon and other price-discounting promotions.
If an agricultural commodity industry is considering how it will implement a national
generic promotion program, industry participants need to evaluate anticipated revenues for
the proposed program. The inclusion of import assessments may or may not add signiﬁcantly
to the anticipated budget. Because the size of the budget affects the mix and type of
advertising, the potential contribution of import assessments must be compared to other goals
and objectives of the proposed program. For example, a desire to promote with a national
identity associated with the commodity may have to be balanced with a desire to undertake
Table 4



















(million $) (million $) (%) Total Importers ($)
Beef 46.0 7.0 15 111 7 171,000
Upland cotton 60.0 21.0 35 29 6 186,000
Honey 4.6 1.7 37 13 4 118,000
Fresh mushrooms 3.2 0.1 3 9 0
a 76,000
Pork 55.0 3.8 7 15 1 166,000
Potatoes 10.7 0.4 4 32 1 123,000
Watermelons 2.0 0.2 10 31 2 64,000
Source: Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA—various documents.
aImporter participation on the fresh mushroom board is contingent upon a minimum volume requirement of 35
million pounds. Once that volume is reached, importers will have one seat on the board. In 1998, approximately
23 million pounds of fresh mushrooms were imported into the U.S.
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the proposed program’s anticipated annual budget to near or over the $20 million threshold,
the inclusion of import assessments could make it possible for an industry to ﬁnance national
television advertising, but would prevent the industry from promoting with a national
identity.
6. Economies of scale
As stated in the 1996 farm bill, “generic commodity promotion programs are of particular
beneﬁt to small producers who often lack the resources or market power to advertise on their
own, and who are otherwise often unable to beneﬁt from the economies of scale available in
promotion and advertising (Title V, Subtitle A).” No speciﬁc economies of scale are listed
in this section of the farm bill, but the following highlights possible sources of economies of
scale as alluded to in the Act.
Standard production economics asserts that returns to scale exist when marginal or
average costs are decreasing as more units of output are produced. Under these conditions,
increasing returns to scale exist until the physical plant is at capacity, where capacity is
deﬁned as the level of production where the marginal return of producing one more unit of
output is zero.
In the speciﬁc case of generic commodity promotion programs, the “units of output” are
in terms of enhanced demand for the commodity. The “physical plant” is the combination of
all of the advertising and promotion activities of the program. “Capacity” is reached when
the marginal return of one more “unit” of advertising and promotion is zero. In other words,
the advertising and promotion has reached a saturation point where the costs of further
changing the buying behavior of consumers exceeds the returns in increased demand for the
commodity. As noted previously, without generic commodity promotion programs, generic
advertising and promotion of agricultural commodities will be undersupplied to the market
because of free-rider problems. To assert that these promotional activities are undersupplied
is to assert that the promotional programs are not at capacity, and that there is the potential
for increasing returns (i.e., economies of scale) to additional advertising and promotion
activities.
An additional source of economies of scale exists in terms of the distribution of costs. As
Schmid notes, “the cost facing one buyer depends on the number of people with similar taste
(Schmid, 1987, p. 72).” Schmid continues, noting that as the number of buyers increases, the
cost of making an “indivisible good” available is distributed more widely to more and more
buyers.
In the case of participants in an agricultural commodity industry seeking to enhance
demand for their produce and food products, the buyers are the individual industry partic-
ipants and the indivisible good is enhanced demand. In this situation, economies of scale
exist in terms of decreasing cost to each buyer as more buyers are included in the ﬁnancing
of activities that enhance demand for the agricultural commodity (e.g., generic promotion
and advertising). For example, if a U.S. domestic industry organizes and ﬁnances a national
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bear all of the costs of that effort. On the other hand, if these U.S. growers and/or processors
cooperate with importers, the costs of these activities can be distributed over a broader base
of support.
A third, though relatively minor, source of economies of scale exist with the start-up costs
for the layout and setting of advertising copy or for making television commercials. Once
these materials are created, they can be used multiple times. The costs of doing more
advertising using these same materials are no longer associated with their production, but
with the costs of buying print space or television air-time. Under conditions like these, there
are scale economies that can be realized by distributing the production costs over more and
more applications of the advertising materials. However, it is important to note that the bulk
of the costs of advertising are in buying print space, or radio or television air-time, not in the
production of the advertising copy or ﬁlmed advertisements.
7. Role of government
The government helps assure compliance on the part of all industry participants covered
by a national promotion program. This enforcement role assures that assessment fees are paid
by everyone, and assures all participants that all others are “paying their share.” Knowing
that the government can enforce the terms of the program greatly reduces the potential for
nonpayment, and hence free-riding by individuals within the industry.
When national promotion programs assess imports, U.S. Customs acts on the behalf of the
promotional boards by collecting assessment fees on the imported produce/products covered
by the program. Because all imports must pass through customs, this provides the promo-
tional boards with virtually 100% compliance on all imported product at virtually no costs
to the board. Customs also can gather information for the board that facilitates the board’s
ability to track the country-of-origin of all imports, and data on country-speciﬁc volume of
imported product.
Through its legal framework (institutionalized by legislation and regulation), the govern-
ment also provides the legal basis that facilitates the creation and maintenance of promo-
tional programs. At the federal level, the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the
USDA is paid by industries to organize the required review and voting process that is used
to implement a national promotion program. The AMS also has oversight of the programs
once they are established.
Industries are required to compensate the AMS for services that it provides to national
promotion boards. These include the costs incurred by AMS to help an industry start a
program as well as annual oversight of the program once it is in place.
7 According to ofﬁcials
at the AMS, implementation costs for a national promotion program will cost an industry a
minimum of approximately $80,000.
8 Column 6 of Table 4 lists examples of the annual user
fees charged to promotion boards in ﬁscal year 1998.
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Because a number of national generic promotion programs have been operating for some
time, information was sought concerning key factors, common problems, and highlighted
successes of these programs. To gather these experiences and insights, numerous key
informants were contacted informally by telephone and interviewed about their perspectives
on generic promotion of agricultural commodities. These key informants included executive
administrators and other support staff of national promotion boards and state level marketing
boards, board members, and other growers/producers closely involved in their industry’s
promotional efforts, and staff at the AMS of the USDA. The following section synthesizes
their comments and observations.
8.1. Fairness
The perception of fairness is the factor most frequently identiﬁed as being important to the
viability of an agricultural industry’s self-funded promotional program. Foremost are con-
cerns about free-riding; a program that permits some producers, processors or shippers to
obtain the beneﬁts of commodity promotion without helping pay for the costs of creating that
promotion program typically will be considered unfair by others within an agricultural
industry. Any program that is designed to permit someone to ride free will likely be
challenged by others who are paying into the program. But the success of these challenges
will depend on what the majority within an industry considers “fair” (e.g., the majority may
argue that it is “fair” to exempt producers and/or importers with very small market volumes).
For example, Rosselle (1999) reports about the importance of perceived fairness in the
context of the now defunct national promotional program for fresh-cut ﬂowers. She notes
that Ronald Ward studied the effects of this program’s advertising campaign, and he “found
that the advertising clearly was attracting buyers. But because the ﬂoral industry remains
diverse—and some sectors of it perceived they were being shortchanged while others were
experiencing a windfall—the industry voted out the campaign (p. A8).”
Another aspect of “fairness” that is frequently discussed focuses on the degree of
representation within the administration of a program for various segments within an
agricultural industry. There are clear trade-offs between having representation based strictly
on volume verses structuring representation such that all participants, regardless of their
size/volume, have some representation within the decision processes. Checks and balances
are needed to keep both large and small volume producers/states/countries working together
within a system that is perceived by all to be fair. Typically, the composition of a program’s
Board is used as one way to provide such checks and balances. For example, as noted in
Table 4, all national promotional programs that assess imports have positions reserved for
importers on their boards.
When addressing concerns about fairness, a common strategy for structuring promotion
boards is to add more board positions for various segments of an industry, especially for
those with claims of under-representation in proposed or already existing programs. But this
strategy highlights other trade-offs between “fair” representation and the possibilities of
cumbersome, exceedingly large boards with dozens of members (as noted in Table 4, the
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members are too many, and at what point is everyone fairly represented need to be based
upon the speciﬁc situation of each agricultural commodity industry. But how these trade-offs
are resolved can be an important factor inﬂuencing a program’s long-term viability.
8.1.1. Common objectives
A shared vision of the objectives of a commodity promotion program is also frequently
listed by key informants as a critically important issue. According to these key informants,
a shared set of objectives is the surest way to rally industry support for implementing and/or
continuing a generic promotional program. For example, “growing the market” could be a
shared objective that an industry might identify as a primary motivation for organizing a
promotion program.
When seasonality effects are favorable, and imported produce/products can help a U.S.
agricultural industry extend the marketing year by keeping fresh produce in retail stores, the
U.S. industry has a stronger incentive to seek partnerships with import industries. Their
shared marketing goals could be complemented by a national promotion program.
However, if a U.S. industry is in direct competition with imported products, there more
likely will be some dispute over the objectives of a promotional program. Some in the U.S.
industry may argue that the objectives of a promotion program should be to focus on the
promotion of U.S. products/produce. Others may counter that promotion boards have very
limited budgets, and do not have adequate ﬁnancial resources that are needed to promote a
commodity on the basis of national origin. This trade-off between “any product movement
is good movement” verses “buy American” approaches to promotion are clearly based on
conﬂicting objectives. As an industry considers implementing and/or continuing a promo-
tional program and/or assessing imports, clearly specifying which of these overall objectives
are the program’s priorities is critical to the program’s viability.
The enabling statutes that permit agricultural industries to organize national generic
promotion programs also permit the use of assessment revenue for funding research and
development activities. A U.S. agricultural commodity industry may come to a consensus
that both promotion and research are needed, or perhaps only research. When one of the
primary uses of assessment fees is to fund production-oriented research (e.g., reducing
production costs for U.S. farmers), there is little incentive for import industries to help fund
this program. Such a program primarily beneﬁts U.S. industry participants, and may actually
be a long-term threat to imports. Alternatively, U.S. industries and importers may share a
common need for market research and development (e.g., consumer surveys or focus groups
on preferences and buying habits) that would be beneﬁcial to all of the program participants.
These cases exemplify an industry’s need to establish a system for setting research
priorities that is perceived to be fair by all those paying fees into the program. However, if
the objectives of a promotion and research program are not necessarily in the best interests
of all potential program participants, then limiting who pays into certain components of these
programs may be a way that the programs can be implemented (e.g., do not include
assessments on imported products if importers have conﬂicting interests with the overall
objectives of a proposed program, or do not assess imports for the production-oriented
research component of a program if that research primarily beneﬁts the U.S. industry).
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Many of the interviewed informants emphasize the importance of establishing and main-
taining communication links across an industry. Establishing institutions that foster shared
communications can be challenging for some promotion programs because these programs
have both a national scope that may involve several agricultural regions and market seg-
ments, and potentially an international scope that transcends national borders (e.g., the beef
program collects assessment fees from dairy, veal, and beef cattle industry segments as well
as on imported cattle, beef and beef products). Consequently, effective communication is
very important to the establishment, learning and acceptance of shared objectives and
strategies for an industry. Communication is also central both to building a strong sense of
cooperation and trust between different segments of an industry, and to creating a shared
sense of fair representation and “ownership” of promotion program activities.
To date, the extent to which the existing national generic promotion programs have
fostered a greater sense of cooperation and trust between U.S. industries and import
industries is limited and varied by commodity industry. However, familiarity can foster a
greater sense of trust. Promotion boards provide an institutional setting that brings together
a broad set of industry interests. For some industries, a promotional board may be the main
organizational structure that formally brings together the U.S. and import industries. Within
this context, new and strategically vital initiatives may be developed between U.S. industry
participants, their counterparts in other countries, and U.S. importers.
9. Summary
Promotional assessment fees on commodity products imported into the U.S. can help
eliminate certain aspects of free-rider problems, capture greater economies of scale, and
potentially extend the beneﬁts of demand-expanding promotional programs that are designed
to enhance the economic performance of agricultural commodity industries. The nature and
structure of an agricultural commodity market (e.g., relative market shares, seasonality, and
the ability to store products) can also inﬂuence the degree to which promotional assessment
fees on imported products are a viable feature of a national promotion program. Along with
these market characteristics, perceptions of “fairness” and “ownership” of the decision
process, commonly held objectives by industry participants, and well-established commu-
nication links help form the basis for an industry’s efforts to implement and/or continue a
national generic promotion program. National promotion programs that assess imported
products can also provide an institutional setting for fostering international cooperation
between U.S. industry participants, their counterparts in other producing countries, and U.S.
importers.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Ninth World Congress of the
International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA), June 13–16,
1999, Florence, Italy.
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tion programs include sheep (Feedstuffs, September 13, 1999), sweet corn (The
Packer, April 12, 1999), asparagus (The Packer, April 5, 1999), and apples (The
Packer, February 8, 1999). The Agricultural Marketing Service is currently seeking
comments on proposed promotional programs for cultivated blueberries and olive oil,
and also reports that the kiwifruit industry is considering a national promotion
program.
3. Concerning the term “mandatory,” Cook notes, “It is important to understand that
while, once approved, mandated marketing programs carry the enforcement power of
the government, they are industry-ﬁnanced and industry-initiated rather than govern-
ment imposed. In other words, producers and/or handlers of a commodity sponsor the
development of a mandated program, and design it according to their needs. Only
after a program is approved by a majority vote does it become mandatory for the
commodity and industry involved (Cook, 1996, p. 21).”
4. The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to exempt from a mandatory program
small quantities of production (and/or imports, if imports are included in a program).
In such a case, some production, albeit very small volumes, would not be mandatorily
assessed (although these producers would have the option of participating voluntarily
in the program).
5. Some promotional boards (e.g., honey), that were created with free-standing legisla-
tion before the 1996 farm bill, were authorized with representation on boards that is
not proportional to market volumes, thereby limiting the role of importers and the
number of board seats available to them.
6. U.S. regional and state-level agricultural industries face a similar choice about how to
effectively enhance demand for their commodities. They must decide if they want to
promote their commodities with a state, regional, or national identity (e.g., “Florida
orange juice” or “U.S. orange juice”), or with just generic advertising (“Orange juice,
it’s not just for breakfast anymore”).
7. A key difference between national promotion programs and federal marketing orders
is that USDA administrative costs of marketing orders are not billed to the industries.
8. This cost estimate is based on recent experiences with a noncontroversial program
with a small board. Implementation costs can include AMS review of proposed
program, publishing the proposal, overseeing the industry referendum, and appoint-
ment of the board. According to the AMS, costs may be signiﬁcantly higher for
complex programs that are controversial (i.e., require numerous public comments
and/or Congressional inquires) and/or have large boards.
9. The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 is often referred to as
the 1996 FAIR Act or, more simply, the 1996 farm bill.
10. The statute permits several deﬁnitions of “simple majority” for referendum approval.
An industry is free to specify that passage can be by either a majority of persons
voting, persons voting for approval who represent a majority of the volume of the
agricultural commodity, or a majority of persons voting for approval who also
represent a majority of the volume of the agricultural commodity.
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promotion
Before the 1996 farm bill, national generic promotional programs could only be autho-
rized with the passage of “free-standing legislation”—an act of Congress that created a
Promotional Board with the authority to collect promotional assessment fees from producers,
growers, importers, handlers and/or processors within a speciﬁed agricultural commodity
industry.
9 The 1996 farm bill included a statute, the “Commodity Promotion, Research, and
Information Act of 1996,” which eliminated the need for free-standing legislation by giving
the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture the authority to oversee and approve the creation of
national promotion boards. This institutional change greatly reduces the political games-
manship necessary to create a promotional board, and helps explain the growing interest in
promotional boards across the U.S. agricultural sector.
National promotion programs, by deﬁnition, assess all U.S. production (or processing
volume) of a commodity industry, and also allow assessment fees on imported products.
These programs are authorized to “establish an orderly process for developing, ﬁnancing, and
carrying out a program of generic promotion, research, and information for commodities. . .
The promotion programs. . . are generic in the sense that the objective is to expand and
otherwise promote markets and industry-wide developments for speciﬁc commodities—
without reference to speciﬁc producers or brand names (Wright, 1997, p. 56).” An industry
must reimburse the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for all costs incurred in creating
the board (i.e., “implementation fees”), as well as all costs associated with overseeing the
board’s activities once it is in operation (i.e., “user fees”).
As part of the implementation process, an industry-wide referendum must be conducted
in which a simple majority is needed for approval of the national promotion program.
10
However, the Congressional statute permits two alternatives for an industry referendum. One
alternative is an initial referendum, conducted to see if the growers, producers, handlers
and/or importers to be covered by the program favor having the program implemented. This
type of referendum is conducted before the program begins to collect assessments. The
second alternative is to implement the national promotion program and then conduct a
required referendum within three years after the starting date of assessment fee collection.
Before the passage of the 1996 farm bill, two commodities—fresh cut ﬂowers and
pecans—were authorized by free-standing legislation to use the delayed referendum alter-
native to implement their national promotion programs. In both cases, these programs were
voted out at the time of the required referendum (62% of those voting in the pecan
referendum and 58% of those voting in the fresh cut ﬂower referendum voted to terminate
their programs). Given these experiences, the staff at the AMS is now very cautious with
program proposals submitted by agricultural industries that want to use the delayed refer-
endum alternative to create a national promotion program.
Federal marketing orders are authorized by the U.S. Congress through the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA). Federal marketing orders have a broad set of
potential mandates that may or may not include programs for generic promotion and
advertising. Under the provisions of the AMAA, marketing orders also can regulate the
quality and/or quantity of a commodity, fund the provision of marketing information, and/or
242 J. Sterns, D. Ricks / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 3 (2000) 227–243fund research and development activities. Marketing orders do not necessarily include all of
the U.S. production of a commodity industry, and cannot include promotional assessment
fees on imported products. The USDA ﬁnances all implementation and oversight costs of
federal marketing orders. As part of the implementation process, public hearings must be
held and, in most cases, a referendum of industry “handlers” (e.g., producers/growers,
processors) must pass with a two-thirds majority.
Federal marketing agreements also are authorized by the AMAA and have most of the
same features as federal marketing orders, with one fundamental difference. Marketing
agreements differ in that they are binding only on handlers who have voluntarily agreed to
participate in the program (with marketing orders, all individuals and businesses who are
classiﬁed as handlers within the geographic scope of the marketing order must abide by the
requirements and regulations of the order). Because of their voluntary participation, mar-
keting agreements are rarely used, and only one is currently active (an agreement for quality
control in domestically-produced peanuts).
State-level marketing orders and state marketing commissions, in most cases, very closely
mirror their national equivalents in structure and design. But by deﬁnition their geographic
scope is limited to the borders of the state that have authorized these orders or commissions.
And as is the case at the federal level, one of the key differences is that state marketing orders
have mandatory participation, while state commissions may be based either on voluntary or
mandatory participation.
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